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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Lower Court err in dismissing the Butcher's Cause of Action as being barred by 
the Statute of Limitations. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Statutes 
This appeal addresses the manner in which the district court applied the six year statute 
of limitations, Sections 78-12-1 and 78-12-23, U.C.A., I953, as amended, to bar an 
accounting under a written land development contract stipulation to apportion and account for 
the proceeds from the sales of certain lands,. Section 78-12-1, U.C.A., reads as follows: 
"78-12-1. Time for Commencement of actions generally.-Civil actions can 
be commenced only within the period prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action 
shall have accrued, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by 
statute." 
Section 78-12-23, U.C.A., reads as follows: 
"78-23-23. Within six years.-Within six years: 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligations or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding section [78-12-22]. 
More particularly, it addresses the Lower Court's failure to extend the time period 
pursuant to Section 78-12-44, U.C.A., I953, as amended, for bringing an action for an 
accounting another six years from the date Mr. Gilroy received payment of all or part of the 
principal and interest under the contract when he sold the property to his son's corporation 
without notice to the Butchers. Section 78-12-44 reads as follows: 
"78-12-44. Payment-Acknowledgment-Promise to pay extends period. 
-In anv case founded on contract, when anv part of the principal or interest shall have 
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to 
pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within the period 
prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such 
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable 
either as a cause of faction or ground of defense. (Emphasis added). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The lower court dismissed the Butcher's action for an accounting and review of the 
reasonableness of the terms of the sale under a written settlement agreement where the proceeds 
of the sale of certain real estate were to be divided 32% to the appellants-Butchers and 68% to 
respondents-Gilroy and his family corporation R.G.H., Inc. owned and controlled by his son on 
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run. 
The Butchers challenge this ruling under the facts of this case upon the grounds that where 
one mutual obligor received the proceeds from the land sale within the statute of limitations 
time period, it extended the statutory time period to run another six years from receipt of the 
sale proceeds. Co-obligor Frank G. Gilroy sold the property in question just prior to the 
lapsing of the statute of limitations to a family corporation, R.G.H., Inc., and restarted the six 
year statute of limitations from the date of sale. As suit was brought within six years from the 
date of the land sale, the Butchers contend that Frank G. Gilroy was liable for an accounting and 
review of the reasonableness of the terms of the sale under the terms of the stipulation. As this 
accounting cause of action was initiated within the extended period of the statute of limitations, 
the lower court's ruling should be reversed and remanded for an accounting and review of the 
reasonableness of the terms of the land sale. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL L BUTCHER and 
IRENE B. BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H., INC., 
a Utah corporation 
Defendants and Respondents 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This is an action for an accounting and review of the reasonableness of the terms of a land 
sale under a settlement agreement where the proceeds of the sale were to be divided 32% to the 
Butchers and 68% to Frank K. Gilroy. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the appeal, the facts alleged in the Butcher's Amended Complaint are 
deemed admitted; see Bryan vs. Stillwater Board of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1319,1321 (10th Cir. 
1977) 
Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint alleged that on or about October 18,1971, Wendell 
L. Butcher, Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy entered into a written Settlement Agreement 
concerning a dispute of 33 acres abutting the Mountain Dell Golf Course owned by the Butchers 
and wrongfully conveyed by the Butcher's former attorney, Peter M. Lowe, to Frank K. Gilroy, a 
copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint (R. 37-41). 
Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint further alleged that Frank K. Gilroy was to hold 
title to the 33 acres surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement in paragraph 6 
of the stipulation that he sell the property by April, I976 for the best price attainable and the 
proceeds be apportioned with 32% paid to the Butchers and 68% paid to Frank K. Gilroy (R.34). 
Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint alleged that the Butchers and Frank K. Gilroy 
attempted to sell the property over the years, but because of various subdivision development 
changes and watershed questions, the parties were delayed in selling the property (R.34-35). 
Supreme Court No. 20592 
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Paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint alleged that on or about March 8,1982, within six 
years of the performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the property in question 
to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying the Butchers or accounting to them for their share of the 
proceeds (R.35). A copy of the warranty deed was attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit 
B (R. 42). 
The Butchers continued to attempt to sell the property and periodically notified Frank K. 
Gilroy of their progress in this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified plaintiffs that he had 
sold the property, and continued to encourage the Butchers in their efforts to find a buyer and 
acquire the necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. Based upon Frank K. Gilroy's 
representations and assurances that he was also trying to perform the contract, the Butchers 
continued to attempt to sell the property and work with the city to obtain permits for the 
property (Paragraph 7, Amended Complaint, R. 35). 
To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to the Butchers or pay them the amounts due 
and owing under the stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised (Paragraph 8, Amended 
Complaint R.35). 
The Butchers therefore requested the court to require Frank K. Gilroy to account for all 
monies received and to apportion the same between the parties under the terms of the stipulated 
agreement. In the event Frank K. Gilroy failed to acquire fair market value for the property, 
they requested a judgment against him in the amount of any deficiency. (Paragraph 8, Amended 
Complaint, R.35). 
After the Butchers filed their Amended Complaint, defendants and respondents refused to 
produce any discovery documents pursuant to the Butchers' Motion to Produce (R. 18). Instead, 
the defendants and respondents moved to dismiss the action based on the statute of limitations 
(R.47). The lower court then dismissed the Action (R. 82,83), even though the Butchers 
apprised the court in their February 14,1985 Supplemental Reply Memorandum that defendant 
Gilroy was absent from the State to prevent the tolling of the statute and that both defendants and 
respondents repeatedly promised to try and sell the property to induce plaintiffs from suing (R. 
75). From the order of dismissal, this appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
CAUSE OF ACTION NOT BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
An action based upon a written contract must be commenced within six years after the 
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cause of action occurred; see Section 78-12-1, Section 78-12-23(2), U.C.A., I953, as 
amended. Thus, the accounting action had to be initiated on or before April, I982 (six years 
after the date specified for sale sale of the property by April, I976) unless Frank K. Gilroy 
engaged in some type of conduct to extend the statutory period. The Butchers argue that Frank K. 
Gilroy's secret March I982 sale of the real estate to R.G.H., Inc. was the date from which the 
statute of limitations ran on their action for an accounting in the same manner suites based on 
breach of warranty do not begin to run until the date of a sale of an article; see M.H. Walker 
Realty Co. vs. American Surety Co. of New York, 60 U. 435, 211 P. 998 (1922). 
Under Section 78-12-44, U.C.A., I953, as amended, if respondents received payments of 
any part of the principal or interest due under the contract, the statute of limitations runs anew 
from the date of receipt of payment. Section 78-12-44, U.C.A., I953, as amended, reads as 
follows: 
"78-12-44. Payment-acknowledgment-promise to pay extends 
period. In any case, founded on contract, when any part of the principal or 
interest shall have been paid...an action may be brought within the period 
prescribed for the same after such payment,...." 
Frank K. Gilroy received payment for the property subject to the written stipulation in 
March, I982. Receipt of this payment extend the statute of limitations for an accounting for 
another six years from the date of payment - i.e. March, I988. Suit for an accounting and review 
of the terms of sale was brought in I984 well within the extended period of time, since the 
contract in question required both the Butchers and Frank H. Gilroy to mutually attempt to sell 
the property and then account to one another for the profits received. As a consequence, the 
statute of limitations began to run anew the moment the cause of action for an accounting and 
review of the sale terms arose when the funds were received; see Frederickson vs. Knight Land 
Co., 667 P.2d 34 (I983) where the Utah Supreme Court indicated that on a contract to mutually 
account for proceeds received from the sale of the land, the statute of limitations begins to run 
again on the date of the breach for failure to account for funds received from the land sale. 
Frank K. Gilroy sold the land in question to R.G.H., Inc. in March, I982, within the statute 
of limitations period, and failed to have the terms of the sale approved by or account to the 
Butchers for their portion of the sale proceeds. As a consequence, a breach occurred within the 
statutory time period and restarted the six year statute to run from the date the Frank K. Gilroy 
received the funds. As suit was brought within six years from the date of this breach, the statute 
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of limitations does not bar the action. The motion to dismiss was therefore improperly granted, 
under the Frederickson case criteria reaffirming the mutual accounting doctrines contained in 
Toponce vs. Corinne Mill and Stock Company, 6 Utah 439, 24 P.2d 493, affirmed 152 U.S. 405, 
14 S.Ct. 632 (1890). 
Based on the foregoing case law, and the fact that Frank K. Gilroy concealed the sale and 
repeatedly encouraged the Butchers to try and sell the property to prevent Butchers from suing 
(R. 35), he should be estopped from the raising the defense of the statute of limitations; see Rapp 
vs. Rapp, 218 Cal 505, 24 P.2d 161 (1933). 
The Butchers also pointed out in their supplemental reply memorandum to the lower court 
that there is a question of fact as to whether the Gilroys, who maintain a Nevada residence, were 
absent from the state a sufficient time to prevent the tolling of the statute. Frank K. Gilroy's 
extended stays in Nevada would delay the tolling of the statute of limitations, until their return 
under Section 78-12-35, U.C.A., I953, as amended; see Snyder vs. Clune, 390 P.2d 9I5,15 U.2d 
54 (I964). To resolve this issue, the lower court should have reserved ruling on the matter 
until after discovery had been completed. As Utah is a notice pleading state, issues regarding the 
tolling of the statutes of limitation involve questions of fact which cannot be resolved solely from 
the face of the complaint. 
Nor can R.G.H., Inc. be arbitrarily dismissed from the cause of action as a matter of law. 
Since Frank K. Gilroy refused to undergo discovery, the Butchers were not able to determine if 
the sale of the property was an installment sale, a conditional sale, or an outright sale. If the sale 
was conditional, the property would revert back to Frank K. Gilroy upon default of the conditions. 
Title would not be able to be cleared without R.G.H., Inc.'s joinder as a necessary party. If the 
funds were to be paid over a period of time, then R.G.H., Inc. was a also a necessary party to 
insure that the funds were paid into court until the accounting was completed. 
In summary, the cause of action was initiated within the extended statute of limitations 
time period, and the lower court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Butchers respectfully request the court to reverse the 
lower court's Order and remand the case for an accounting and review of the reasonableness of the 
terms of the land sale. Respondents are seeking a windfall of the fair market value of the sale 
proceeds where were to be divided 32% to the Butchers and the 68% balance to respondents. 
Frank K. Gilroy has converted the proceeds of the sale and should not be rewarded for his 
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clandestine bad faith actions. 
Dated this ^H day of April, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By ^ ^ — " - ^ 7 , , ^ -
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney for Wendell L Butcher and Irene B. 
Butcher 
CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Appellants Brief were served by mailing 
the same, first class, postage prepaid, this ^ y day of April, 1987 to the following: 
James R. Holbrook 
Steven E. Tyler 
Russell C. Kearl 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
Suite 800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: 801-530-7300 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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COMPIAENT AND ORDER 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Tower, Suite 701 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-8622 
— HI ft ''A? Or^C-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL L. BUTCHER and IRENE B. 
BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
FRANK K. GILROY, and R.G.H. 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C84-1826 
Judge Leary 
COME NOW Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher and 
allege as follows: 
1. Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher are residents 
of the State of Utah. 
2. Frank K. Gilroy is a resident of the State of Utah. 
3. R.G.H., Inc. is a Utah corporation. 
4. On or about October 18, 1971, Wendell L. Butcher, 
Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy stipulated to an entry 
of an order and judgment as Civil No. 179775. As part of the 
stipulation, a settlement agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
was entered into. Frank K. Gilroy was to hold title to 33 acres 
surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement 
in paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April, 1976 for the 
best price attainable and the proceeds be apportioned with 
32% paid to the plaintiffs and 68% paid to the defendant. 
5. Plaintiffs and Frank K. Gilroy attempted to sell the 
property over the years but because of various subdivision 
development changes and watershed questions, the parties were 
delayed in selling the property. 
6. On or about March 8, 1982, within six years of the 
performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the 
property in question to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying 
plaintiffs or accounting to them for their share of the proceeds. 
A copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Exhibit B., 
and by this reference incorporated herein. 
7. Plaintiffs continued to attempt to sell the property 
and periodically notified Frank K. Gilroy of their progress in 
this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified plaintiffs 
that he had sold the property, and continued to encourage 
plaintiffs in their efforts to find a buyer and acquire the 
necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. Based upon 
Frank K. Gilroyfs representation and assurances that he was also 
trying to perform the contract, plaintiffs continued to attempt 
to sell the property and work with the city to obtain permits 
for the property. 
8. To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to 
plaintiffs or pay them the amounts due and owing under the 
stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised. 
9. Plaintiffs therefore request the court to require Frank 
K. Gilroy to account for all moneys received and to apportion the 
same between the parties under the terms of the stipulated agreement. 
In the event Frank K. Gilroy failed to acquire fair market value 
for the property, for a judgment against him in the amount of any 
deficiency. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 
1. For the court to require Frank K. Gilroy to account to 
plaintiffs for all sums received from the sale of the property. 
2. For judgment to be entered against Frank K. Gilroy 
for the amounts due and owing plaintiffs under the stipulated 
agreement. 
3. For such other and further relief as the court may 
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deem just and equitable under the premises. 
DATED this /o^day of August, 1984. 
-^MARCUS G. THEODORE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Address of Plaintiffs: 
3980 Eldorado Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed first class postage 
prepaid this 16th day of October, 1984 to Steven E. Tyler, 
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hansen, 175 South West Temple, 
#700, Salt Lake City, UT 84101. 
(vijOtts ~U3ot*U#r>-^ 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this day of 
October, 1971, by and between Wendell L. Butcher, hereinafter 
referred to as "Butcher" and Frank K. Gilroy, hereinafter referred 
to as "Gilroy". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, the above named parties are presently involved in 
Jit ip-iiJoj) in the Third Judicial District Court in Case No. 179775, 
entitled "Frank K. Gilroy, Plaintiff, vs. Peter M. Lowe, el al., 
Defendants"; and 
WHEREAS, both Gilroy and Butcher have claims against each 
otln ] and desire to resolve and settle said claims prior to the 
final judgment of the Court trying this matter. 
NOW, THLREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of 
Die mutual promises of the parties contained herein, the parties 
agree as follows: 
1. Gilroy will pay to Butcher the sum of $35,000 cash, pay-
able within five (5) days of the date of this Agreement. 
2. Butcher hereby acknowledges that the foregoing sum is 
received a^ complete satisfaction of his claim against Frank K. 
lliljuy J c> J damage? , and booby waives all claim and intoreM in find 
1d the piopoly known as Mountain Dell Estates, which is the subject 
mat to of the above mentioned litigation. It is recognized that 
Buiehers have heretofore elected to abandon any rights under Die 
contjaet d.jted July 20, 1903, relative to the Mountain Dell properties, 
37 
i nd r h a l l s t i p u l a t e t h a t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment may be entered tha t 
D»e\ h«*vc no i n t o - e s t t b o e i n . But o h o s sha l l fin t her s t i p u l a t e 
tha i the pending Counterclaim by Butchers aga ins t Gilroy s h a l l be 
d»cnii«scd with p i e j u d i c e . Butcher s h a l l quit claim to GiJm\ any 
and a l l r i g h t , t i t l e or i n t e r e s t he may have or claim in and to 
the Mountain Dell p r o p e r t i e s , and the s o - c a l l e d Fisl ier and \\\,nd 
pi ( . p a r t i e s . Butchers and Gil roy s h a l l provide to each o the r r e c i p r o -
cal (^ n o al Releases of a l l claims or l i a b i l i t i e s to d a t e . 
Page 1 of 5 
3. Butcher agrees to obtain approval from the appropriate 
county and state authorities for permission to subdivide the Mountain 
Dell property and shall be entitled to a period of 36 months from 
the date of this Agreement to obtain such approval. Gilroy agrees 
to execute such documents as owner of the properties as may be 
required in order to obtain sucli approval, provided, however, that 
Gilroy shall not be required to expend any funds in connection with 
the effort tc obtain said subdivision approval and all costs in con-
nection therewith will be Butcher's expense. It is understood that 
subdivision approval and all development work and expense in order 
to obtain approval of a contemplated subdivision of the Mountain Dell 
properties shall be the responsibility and at the sole expense of 
Butchcj . Gilroy shall have no responsibility whatsoever in subdivi-
sion approval, or any developmental work and expense in connection 
therewith, 03 any subsequent developmental wor); and expense of any 
kind or nature whatsoever. Subdivision approval shall mean absolute 
approval of the subdivision, including approvals of going forth abso-
lutely for the sale of lots, including but not limited io health 
Department approvals, Water Department approvals, Zoning Department 
approvals, State Highway approvals, approvals of all government a3 
agencies and clearances of any kind or nature whatsoever in ordc1 to 
go forward and sell lots without any restrictions of any kind. 
*i. Butcher agrees to employ the firm of Coon. King K knowlton 
or some other competent engineering firm mutually agreed upon to assist 
him in obtaining the approval of the subdividing of the Mountain Dell 
Lstate properties and to pay all costs in connection therewith and 
in audition any legal or other expenses necessary to obtain such 
approval . Butcher agrees to follow the recommendations of such 
engineers in obtaining such subdivision approval, and it is nude 1 -
slood Hi, I i J thi subdivision fippj oval is not obtained by i 1 a.« on of 
Butcher's failure to follow the recommendations of the engineering 
firm employed to assist in obtaining subdivision approval his recovery 
from the sale or disposition of the property as hereinafter provided 
sliall he reduced by 10/o. 
38 
EXHIBIT A 
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5. In the event the subdivision is approved within 36 
months from the date of this Agreement, the first proceeds from 
the sale of lots shall be paid to Gilroy until Gilroy lias received 
the sum of $80,SOS•SB, together with interest thereon from the date 
of this Agreement to the date of payment calculated at a rate of 8% 
per annum. Provided, that in the event Gilroy is required to pay 
interest on the $35,000 paid to Butcher in connection with this 
settlement agreement, Butcher will pay such additional interest 
rate, but not more than a total rate of 9% per annum as to the 
$3S9000. 'Tirst proceeds1' shall mean the net proceeds from the 
sale of each lot, less escrow fees and expenses of sale. 
0. In the event butcher is unable to obtain subdivision 
approval within 30 months from the date of this Agreement, then, and 
in thai event, the Mountain Dell Estates property shall be sold or 
disposed of for the best price obtainable, and from the proceeds of 
sue)-) saJe Gilroy aiax3 JJutcber will receive a proportionate share based 
upon the investment of Gilroy in the property of $80,50B.S8 and the 
investment of Butcher in the property of $40,877.43. The sale or dis-
po«:it ion shall be conducted within 18 months immediately following 
tiif cxpiiat ion of the 30 month period set forth in paragraph 3 heroin, 
and ?.neb sa.le or disposition shall be conducted by Gilroy at a juice 
to be uet ojjiiined by Gilroy in bis own discretion. 
7. It is understood that Gilroy or his designated attorney 
in fact will execute all documents reasonably necessary in order to 
obtain subdivision approval, including but not limited to the Petition 
for Subdivision Approval, the application to the State of Utah for 
p• mission to sell subdivided lands and any other petitions, documents 
and/or agreements with the municipality of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
Cni.vity, Plate of Utah, and/or any subdivisions thereof, provided, 
however, in all such documents there shall be a disclosure of the 
fuct that Gilroy lias not undertaken any responsibility or liability 
?n conned ion with the approval of the subdivision or any develop-
mental work of any kind or nature whatsoever. 
EXHIBIT A 
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8. In the event at any time Gilroy is not satisfied with 
the progress being made in connection with the effort to obtain sub-
division approval, he shall have the right and option, at his own 
expense, to provide additional legal or engineering assistance, but 
sucli assistance will not be chargeable against Butcher's ultimate 
recovery from the sale of the property if the subdivision approval 
is not obtained or from the sale of lots if the subdivision approval 
is obtained. In no event shall the providing of such legal or engi-
neering assistance be construed to obligate Gilroy to perform any 
of the subdivision or developmental responsibilities herein, nor 
excuse Butcher therefrom. 
1). Butcher hereby agrees to defend Gilroy from any claim, 
lien or assertion of judgment or other rights as againsl the Mountain 
Ik .1.1 property or as against Gilroy relative to the Mountain Dell 
property, provided, however, that Butcher shall have 'no liability 
therewith except to provide and pay for sue!) defense. 
10. It is agreed that Gilroy shall be provided with a copy 
of all documents, correspondence or writings which shall be sent or 
received in connection with attempts to gain subdivision approval, 
developmental work and any other matter inconneetion with the Mountain 
Dell properties. Upon request not more often than each six months, 
Gilroy shall receive a written status report and shell have the right 
to examine Butcher's expense records as to the Mountain Dell property 
at any reasonable time. 
11. Butcher agrees not to represent or- hold out to any 
public official, creditor or any other person that Gilroy is a JMH-IJI'-J , 
joint venturer, or stands in a principal-agent relationship v.»1 h 
J-.oi c-h'.-j . Whenever Gilroy *s name shall appear in all such doc*' ;r-n1 s 
there1 shall be a disclosure of the fact that Gilroy has- not under-
taken any responsibility or liability in connection with the approval 
of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature 
whatsoever. 
-5,- EXHIBIT A 
Page A of 5 4 0 
12. Butchers herewith waive and abandon any and all claims 
as against Gilroy by reason of that certain agreement dated July 20, 
1963, between Marlowe Investment Company as Seller and Butchers as 
Buyer, and herewith acknowledge that they will assert no claim of 
any kind or nature by reason of any acts which at any time have been 
occurred by Marlowe Investment Company, or Peter M. Lowe or by reason 
of tbnt certain agreement between Gilroy and Lowe dated February 3, 
1903. Butchers, however, reserve all rights and claims against the 
defendants Lowe and Marlowe. 
13. An escrow arrangement is contemplated in connection with 
tin's transaction, and the parties agree to pay escrow fees hQ% by 
each parly* The escrow instructions shall provide for a release of 
Jots upon payment to Gilioy of the net proceeds of sales thereof, with 
the provision that in no event shall there be any release of Jots with-
out payment to Gilroy of the net proceeds in each instance. Any 
property taxes and assessments paid by Gilroy shall be repaid to 
Gilroy and shall be added to Gilroy's interest in the proceeds payable 
hereunder. Upon payment of Die full balance* due to Gilroy, plus 
interest, the escrow shall be closed and Gilroy shall convey his 
remaining right, title and interest in and to the property to Butcher. 
In the event that Gilroy lias not been paid all sums due within 12 
months after subdivision approval, the escrow agent shall be instructed 
to list the properties for sale over the multiple lisling bureau of 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, at appraisal value. 
IN. Butchers' rights shall be determined entirely by reason 
of this contract, and no other or further agreements exist. Any 
modifications of the foregoing agreement shall be in writing signed 
by the- parties. 
IS. It is understood that both parties to this Agreement 
are reserving all rights which they have or believe they have against 
the (1(-fondants Peter M. Lowe, Martha Lowe and Marlowe Investment 
Company. 
IN VMTN1SS Wlir.kl.Ur, the pait.ies have hen unto r nbsi -i ihed 
tlie.ii nanK'?. the day and yrar f i r.c t above written. 
. _ _ , . . « » • 
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3697636 WARRANTY DEED 
(Sf»«l) 
•4109 . * 
FRAK X. GILROT 
of Las Vegas Wei ada 
CONVEY AMDWASJLAXT tafi by. 
,o R.G.H., H C . , 
3604 Astro C i r c l e , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84199 
of S a l t Lake Ci ty , S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Otah 
Ten and No/100-
and other good and va luab le c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the loUowktf lissiinil a c t of ss*4 m S a l t Lake 
Sttttof Ucaa: 
ssrtsessaof 
—DOLLARS, 
Coasty, 
The northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 
11, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
EXCEPTING such documents as may refer to the rights of way 
of Salt Lake and Eastern Railroad, Utah Central Railroad, 
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Companies, Knight Power 
Company, the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
and Salt Lake County, but which do not definitely locate said 
rights of way in connection with said property. 
Sibject to all current taxes, easements, restrictions and 
rights of way of record or enforceable in law or equity. 
WITNESS, tne and of 
Signed kits* 
«v*f 
fetfe? 
STATE Or UTAH, 
Cowry of S a l t Lake 
On tne 
pmonefly 
Ttf. 
eftfati 
ecrcrf ->rr+«J2s 
Prank K. Gilroy 
t VBOOBxy mast tact 
C/i 
Co 
f 
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GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
JAMES R. HOLBROOK (A-1516) 
STEVEN E. TYLER (A-3301) 
RUSSELL C. KEARL (A-1780) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 3LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
WENDELL L. BUTCHER and 
IRENE B. BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H., 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Civil No. C £4-1826 
Judge John H- Bokich 
* * * * * * * 
The motion of defendants Frank K. Gilroy and R.G.H., 
Inc., to dismiss the above-titled action for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted by reason that all 
claims made therein are barred by the appropriate statute of 
limitations, came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
John H. Rokich on Monday, February 25, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock 
a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore and 
defendants were represented by Steven E. Tyler. Based upon the 
arguments of counsel and the Courtfs review of the memoranda 
filed herein, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. All claims alleged in the plaintiffs1 First Amended 
Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice because they are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Utah Code 
Ann., Section 78-12-23 (Repl. 1977). 
2. In the event that plaintiffs have not filed an Amended 
Complaint stating a claim against defendants which is not barred 
by the statute of limitations on or before March 11, 1985, this 
action is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED THIS / %~ day of A?3r ^  , 1985. 
ATTEST 
K D1X0N4KNDUEY 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT: 
LJL A Q*UL 
John A. Rokich, 
fcmrd District Court Judge 
Marcus G. Theodore, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
ren E. Ty-
Attorney for Defe 
Date 
Date p&o4 SO LQ8-S 
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STATUTES 
78-11-21 JUDICIAL CODE 
(2) The minor recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile, or 
other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, 
train, railway car or caboose, whether moving or standing; or 
(3) The minor intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property 
of another and thereby recklessly endangers human life or recklessly causes 
or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of any public utility 
service. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 181, § 1. tionally damaging, defacing, taking, or 
destroying property; and providing for 
Title of Act. damages when the minor tampers with 
An act relating to parent and child; property and recklessly endangers human 
providing that parents or legal guardians life or recklessly causes a substantial 
of minors are liable up to $1,000 for interruption of any public utility service, 
damages sustained by the minor inten- —L. 1977, ch. 181. 
78-11-21. Property damage caused by minor—When parent or guardian 
not liable.—No parent or guardian shall be so liable if he or she made a 
reasonable effort to supervise and direct their minor child, or in the 
event the parent knew in advance of the possible taking, injury or destruc-
tion by their minor child, he or she made a reasonable effort to restrain it. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 181, § 2. 
CHAPTER 12 
LIMITATION OP ACTIONS 
Section 78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY, 78-12-2 to 78-12-21. 
2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY, 78-12-22 to 78-12-34. 
3. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS, 78-12-35 to 78-12-47,, 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.—Civil actions 
can be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where in special cases 
a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Collection agency bond, actions on, 12 
Supp., 104-12-1. 1-3. 
Common carriers, claims and actions for 
CompUer's Notes. i0Ss or damage to freight, 54-3-16. 
This section is identical to former sec- Contracts for sale of goods, 70A-2-725. 
tion 104-2-1 (Code 1943) which was re- Counties, claims and actions against, 17-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-30. 
County service areas, legality of bonds 
Cross-References.
 a n a proceedings, 17-29-28. 
Accident and sickness insurance policy County water and sewer districts, 17-
provisions, actions on, 31-33-14. 6-3, 17-6-3.11. 
Affirmative defense, statute of limita- Fraternal benefit societies, actions on 
tions as, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule benefit certificates or contracts, 31-29-20. 
8(c). Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et 
Bank statements, when presumed final, seq. 
7-3-51. Improvement district proceedings, 10-
Cemetery maintenance districts, validity 16-28. 
of organization, 8-1-7. Metropolitan water districts, 73-8-17, 73-
Cities and towns, claims and actions 8-30. 
against, 10-7-77, 11-14-21, 63-30-13, 63-30- Model Marketable Title Act, 57-9-1 et 
15, 78-12-29, 78-12-30. seq. 
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Beceivership proceedings as suspending 
statute of limitations, 21 A. L. B. 961. 
Revival of judgment by constructive 
service of process upon nonresident, as 
affected by due process and full faith and 
credit clauses, 144 A. L. B. 403. 
Bight of foreign corporation to plead 
statute of limitations, 122 A. L. B. 1194. 
Bule that adverse possession of succes-
sive holders may be tacked, in determina-
tion of period of limitation, as applicable 
to chattels, 135 A. L. B. 711. 
Bunning of limitation as to action by 
public body against officer or employee 
is deferred until defendant ceases to be 
officer or employee, or until the end of his 
term of office or employment, 137 A. L. B. 
674. 
Bunning of statute of limitations as 
affected by uncertainty as to existence 
of a cause of action because of delay in 
settling or determining a matter of gen-
eral or governmental concern upon which 
it depends, 135 A. L. B. 1339. 
State statute of limitations as affecting 
action or proceeding by federal govern-
ment or its officials, 61 A. L. B. 412. 
Statute of limitations as applicable to 
action by municipality or other political 
subdivision in absence of specific provision 
in that regard, 113 A. L. B. 376. 
Statute of limitations: effect of delay in 
appointing administrator or other repre-
sentative on cause of action accruing at or 
after death of person in whose favor it 
would have accrued, 28 A. L. B. 3d 1141. 
Substitution, or addition, as plaintiff, af-
ter limitation period, of assignee, or trus-
tee in bankruptcy, in action commenced 
by assignor, or bankrupt, within limita-
tion period, but after assignment or bank-
ruptcy, 105 A. L. B. 610. 
Tolling of statute of limitations where 
process is not served before expiration of 
limitation period, as affected by statutes 
defining commencement of action, or ex-
pressly relating to interruption of running 
of limitations, 27 A. L. B. 2d 236. 
Validity, and applicability to causes of 
action not already barred, of a statute 
enlarging limitation period, 79 A. L. B. 
2d 1080. 
Validity and construction of war enact-
ments in United States suspending opera-
tion of statute of limitations, 137 A. L. B. 
1440, 140 A. L. B. 1518. 
When statute of limitation commences 
to run against action to recover tax, 131 
A. L. B. 822. 
When statute of limitations commences 
to run against action to recover or for con-
version of, property stolen or otherwise 
wrongfully taken, 136 A. L. B. 658. 
Withdrawal of foreign corporation from 
state as tolling statute of limitations as 
to action against corporation, 133 A. L. 
B. 774. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Money judgment. 
Notwithstanding former 104-37-6 permit-
ting enforcement of judgment after lapse 
of eight years, an action upon a money 
judgment could not be brought after ex-
piration of eight years. Youngdale v. 
Burton, 102 U. 169, 128 P. 2d 1053. 
Tolling statute. 
In action by administrator, indebtedness 
created by check was held to be barred, 
and statute was not tolled by unauthorized 
acts of plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros., 
Bankers, 75 U. 149, 283 P. 1055. 
78-12-23. Within six years.—Within six years: 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding section 
[78-12-22]. 
History: L. 1951, ca. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-23. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-22 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Cross-References. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limi-
tations, 78-15-3. 
Promise to pay extends period, 78-12-44. 
Accounting. 
Mere dissolution of partnership did not 
of itself give rise to a cause of action in 
partners so as to start running of statute; 
absent proof to establish claim was barred 
by statute of limitations, it was error to 
nonsuit plaintiff in his action for account-
ing. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 U. 189, 259 
P. 313. 
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78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here. 
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding. 
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions. 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.—If when a cause of action 
accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be 
commenced within the term herein limited after his return to the state; 
and if after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time 
of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action. 
History: L. 1951, CJL 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-35. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-36 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Application of section. 
The full time that the debtor is out of 
the state must be excluded in computing 
the time, notwithstanding fact that 
debtor's family may have residence or 
place of abode in state and that service of 
process could be made upon some member 
of debtor's family at its residence or 
place of abode. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. 
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying 
former statute. 
Statute runs only during time debtor 
is openly in state, and immediately on 
his leaving it the statute again ceases to 
run until his return; in computing time 
all periods of absence must be considered 
and added together. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. 
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying 
former statute. 
Maintenance of residence within state 
with persons living therein did not pre-
vent tolling of statute of limitations. 
Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 XJ. 
391, 231 P. 123, applying former statute. 
Construction of section. 
Although generally statutes of limita-
tion are to be liberally construed, it is 
also a well-recognized doctrine that when 
such statutes contain provisions except-
ing certain persons or classes from opera-
tion of statutes, those exceptions are to 
be strictlv construed. Lawson v. Tripp, 
34 U. 28, 95 P. 520. 
Laches. 
Absence of defendant from state does 
not preclude interposition of defense of 
laches to suit for an accounting, even 
though statute of limitations has not 
barred proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 77 U. 
60, 291 P. 298. 
Proof of residence or nonresidence. 
A finding that defendant had his home, 
family and residence in state contin-
uously from time debt was contracted is 
sufficient finding of continuous presence 
in the state. Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239, 
158 P. 788. 
Plaintiff seeking to toll statute has bur-
den of proof; mere proof of nonresidence 
is not a prima facie showing of absence 
from state. Tracey v. Blood, 78 U. 385, 3 
P. 2d 263, applying identically worded 
Idaho statute. 
Tolling of statute as to foreign corpora-
tion. 
Where answer of defendant foreign cor-
poration set up statute of limitations as 
defense and face of pleadings and uncon-
tradicted evidence indicated statute had 
run, it was incumbent on plaintiff to state 
in his reply conditions tolling the statute; 
in Utah, foreign corporation's privilege of 
pleading statute of limitations was not 
conditioned on its compliance with "doing 
business within the state" statutes. Claw-
son v. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72 XJ. 
137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. E. 1318, applying 
former statutes. 
Words and phrases defined. 
The words "return" and "departs" in 
this section comprehend all persons who 
are without the state, and are not con-
fined to the inhabitants thereof. Buraes 
v. Crane, 1 U. 179, applying former statute. 
Word "return" as used in this section 
includes nonresidents as well as citizens 
of state who have gone abroad and re-
turned to state; the words "return to the 
state" are held to be equivalent to "come 
into the state." Lawson v. Tripp, 34 U. 
28, 95 P. 520, applying former statute. 
Collateral References. 
Limitation of Actions^=>8<4, 85. 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 211. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d 725 et seq.J( Limitation of 
Actions § 154 et seq. 
Absence of judgment debtor from state 
as suspending or tolling running of period 
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tion 104-2-44 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Collateral References. 
Limitation of Actions<§=220. 
History: L. 1951, ck 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-44. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-45 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Acknowledgment or promise. 
What constitutes an acknowledgment or 
promise in writ ing depends, of course, upon 
the language thereof. Boukofsky v. Pow-
ers, 1 U. 333, applying former s tatute. 
Stat ing of account between the parties 
will not take case out of s tatute , unless 
such stating is "in writing, signed by the 
par ty to be charged thereby." Anthony 
& Co. v. Savage, 2 U. 466, applying C. L. 
1876, p. 369, § 1126. 
A written acknowledgement of an in-
debtedness upon open account, already 
barred, and a promise in wri t ing to pay 
the same, contained in a le t ter from 
debtor to creditor, becomes a new promise 
in writing, and will not be barred until 
four years from date of new promise. 
Gruenberg v. Buhring, 5 U. 414, 16 P . 
486, applying former statutes. 
A verbal agreement or new promise 
based upon a prior agreement barred by 
statute comes within this section. White-
hill v. Lowe, 10 U. 419, 37 P . 589, applying 
2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3165. 
Letter from defendant to plaintiff held 
denial that defendant was indebted to 
plaintiff in any sum at time of letter 's 
date, rather than acknowledgment of and 
promise to pay amount formerly owing to 
plaintiff by defendant. Thomas v. Glen-
dinning, 13 U. 47, 44 P. 652, applying for-
mer statute. 
Acknowledgment from which by impli-
cation of law promise is to be raised ought 
to be direct and unqualified admission of 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §220. 
51 Am. Jur . 2d 747, Limitation of Ac-
tions § 178. 
t previous, subsisting debt for which debtor 
is liable and which he intends to pay. 
Kuhn v. Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P . 1036, 
applying former statute. 
Under former statute, promise sufficient 
to create new or continuing contract and 
to remove bar of statute was required to 
be express, clear, and unequivocal; if there 
were any conditions or contingency an-
nexed, proof was required to show that 
a such conditions had been performed and 
such contingency had happened, so as to 
raise qualified promise into one which 
g was absolute and unqualified. Kuhn v. 
3 Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P. 1036. 
e Where promise or acknowledgment raises 
Y at best—because vague and indeterminate 
u —mere probable inference of intention to 
pay, and may affect minds of different 
persons differently, it should not be held 
sufficient to evidence new cause of action. 
L Kuhn v. Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P . 1036, 
Y
a applying former statute. 
e Under former statute, held tha t letters 
j written by maker of note to payees there-
in of contained, not only admission of, but 
i] also promise to pay, debt evidenced by 
note, and, under evidence, etc., were suffi-
cient to remove bar of statute. Kuhn v. 
 Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P . 1036. 
J A mere acknowledgment of an existing 
liability is insufficient to revive the debt, 
& but no set phrase or particular form of 
language is required. Anything that will 
d indicate that the party making the ac-
o knowledgment admits that he is still liable 
3
 on the claim is sufficient to revive the 
i debt. O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 U. 578, 160 
o P. 1192, applying former statute. 
L
" Merely scheduling a claim in petition in 
bankruptcy does not operate to waive the 
statute of limitations, or constitute an 
i  acknowledgment that will revive the debt. 
O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 U. 578, 160 P. 
1192, applying former statutes. 
78-12-44. Payment—Acknowledgment—Promise to pay extends period. 
—In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or 
interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing 
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for the 
same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such ac-
knowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of 
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground 
of defense. 
244 
